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Abstract Living systems employ several mechanisms and behaviors to achieve robustness and maintain 
themselves under changing internal and external conditions. Regulation stands out from them as a 
specific form of higher-order control, exerted over the basic regime responsible for the production and 
maintenance of the organism, and provides the system with the capacity to act on its own constitutive 
dynamics. It consists in the capability to selectively shift between different available regimes of self-
production and self-maintenance in response to specific signals and perturbations, due to the action of 
a dedicated subsystem which is operationally distinct from the regulated ones. The role of regulation, 
however, is not exhausted by its contribution to maintain a living system’s viability. While enhancing 
robustness, regulatory mechanisms play a fundamental role in the realization of an autonomous 
biological organization. Specifically, they are at the basis of the remarkable integration of biological 
systems, insofar as they coordinate and modulate the activity of distinct functional subsystems. 
Moreover, by implementing complex and hierarchically organized control architectures, they allow for 
an increase in structural and organizational complexity while minimizing fragility. Finally, they endow 
living systems, from their most basic unicellular instances, with the capability to control their own 
internal dynamics to adaptively respond to specific features of their interaction with the environment, 
thus providing the basis for the emergence of minimal forms of cognition. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the characteristics that differentiate living systems from physicochemical ones is the 
capability to self-produce and self-maintain by means of continuous exchanges of matter and 
energy with the environment. While doing so, organisms exhibit a remarkable robustness in 
how they respond to external perturbations and manage internal variations in such a way as to 
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maintain their viability. They do not just produce, modify and maintain their components in 
order to persist: another distinctive feature of life ─ often included in definitions employed in 
origins of life and synthetic biology (e.g. Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004; Damiano and Luisi 2010; 
Bich and Damiano 2012a) ─ is the adaptive capability to constantly oppose the thermodynamic 
tendency towards disintegration, and to counteract potentially destabilizing interactions with 
the environment.  
From this perspective, robustness is a crucial and ubiquitous biological property, that 
allows living systems to adaptively cope with variation. It is generally regarded as the 
capability of a system to maintain its functions and performances despite perturbations, or 
under uncertainty in general (Kitano 2004; Stelling et al. 2004; Chen 2008). It is often 
associated with degeneracy in the realisation of functions, and characterized in terms of 
flexibility of behaviours or of steady maintenance of some property (Mitchell 2009).  
Physiological mechanisms and behavioral strategies by which organisms achieve 
robustness and maintain their viability as integrated wholes, are implemented at all levels of 
biological organization, and they can range from distributed network properties to more 
complex mechanisms, which rely on different degrees of modularity. An open question, which 
requires careful theoretical scrutiny, is whether mechanisms responsible for achieving 
robustness do not just assure the survival of living systems under changing internal and external 
conditions, but also play a fundamental, inherent, role already in the realization of biological 
organizations and of relevant biological properties. A closely related issue concerns whether 
complex forms of robustness – relying on hierarchical or modular mechanisms – are already 
necessary at the level of minimal life or, instead, they are later additions that ensured the 
survival of living systems in more variable environments than the ones where life might have 
originated. This chapter tackles the open question ─ and aims to provide conceptual tools to 
address the issue related to minimal life ─ from an organizational standpoint. In doing so, it 
regards robustness as a system property, and analyzes it in relation to the whole organization 
of the organism and the environmental conditions in which it operates1.  
A candidate theoretical framework to address these issues is that of biological autonomy. 
Historically inspired by the work of Immanuel Kant (Kant 1790) and Claude Bernard (Bernard 
1865), among others, on the internally self-determined organization of living systems, this 
perspective has been developed in Systems Theory, Cybernetics and Theoretical Biology 
starting from the 1960s (Bich and Damiano, 2008; Bich and Arnellos, 2012; Mossio and Bich, 
2017). The main contributions to this line of research include: Jean Piaget's work on 
organizational closure and thermodynamic openness (Piaget 1967); Robert Rosen's theory of 
M/R-Systems and his formal model of minimal biological organization (Rosen 1972; Rosen 
1991; Letelier et al. 2006); Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela's theory of autopoiesis 
(Varela et al. 1974; Maturana and Varela 1980) and its applications to origins of life and 
synthetic biology (Luisi, 2006); Tibor Ganti's Chemoton Theory (Ganti 1975; Ganti 2003a; 
Ganti 2003b); Stuart Kauffman's auto-catalytic sets and his theory of autonomous systems 
(Kauffman 1986;; Kauffman 2000); and, more recently, the notion of basic autonomy and the 
                                                             
1 An alternative way to address biological robustness, closer to engineering approaches, would be to focus on 
individual behaviours and mechanisms, and on the maintenance of specific functions or performances. 
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organizational approach developed by Alvaro Moreno and collaborators (Ruiz-Mirazo and 
Moreno 2004; Moreno and Mossio 2015).  
The notion of biological autonomy is grounded in the idea that living systems are metabolic 
self-producing systems able to self-maintain and keep their network organization invariant 
through the continuous exchange of matter and energy with the environment. According to this 
perspective, living systems are “endogenously active” (Bechtel 2008), due to their distinctive 
thermodynamic nature. They realize a specific kind of internal organization ─ defined by the 
notion of organizational closure (Varela 1979; Rosen 1991; Bich and Damiano 2008; Mossio 
and Moreno 2010) ─ where not only the very existence and activity of the constituents depend 
on the network of processes of transformation that they realize but, in addition, they 
collectively promote the conditions of their own existence through their interaction with the 
environment. The thermodynamic nature of biological organization, which combines at its core 
endogenous activity with essential interaction with changing environments, implies also that 
the system is required to harbor an internal dynamical variability to enable different viable 
responses to a variety of environmental perturbations. This is one of the reasons why robustness 
plays a crucial role in the characterization of living systems from their most basic instances. 
By adopting this perspective, this chapter advocates the view that complex mechanisms 
implemented by living systems to achieve robustness are essential for an understanding of life 
and of some of its distinctive features. Specifically, by leaning on a theoretical characterization 
of the concepts of biological control and signal (Section 2), it focuses on the organization and 
role of those specialized regulatory mechanisms that contribute to the robustness of living 
systems by coordinating compensatory responses (Section 3). Regulatory mechanisms are 
characterized as forms of higher-order control, exerted over the basic regime responsible for 
the production and maintenance of the organism, in response to specific signals and 
perturbations (see also Bich et al. 2016). The thesis defended in Section 4 is that while 
enhancing robustness, regulatory mechanisms play also a fundamental role in the realization 
of an autonomous biological organization. By enabling the integration and coordination of the 
basic biological functions, they contribute the construction of biological identity. They also 
allow living systems to overcome bottlenecks of complexity in the transitions from basic self-
maintaining (bio)chemical networks to increasingly more sophisticated organizations. 
Moreover (Section 4.2), regulatory mechanisms lay the basis for the emergence of minimal 
forms of cognition already at the unicellular level, when a system becomes capable to internally 
generate operational meanings ─ expressed through self-regulatory loops ─ associated with 
environmental variations.  
2. Basic concepts: stability, control and signal in autonomous systems 
Robustness, as applied to biology, is a general and flexible concept that includes diversified 
properties and phenomena, related to how organisms or their parts cope with variation. It 
admits different approaches depending on level of description and goals: the engineering 
approaches, centered on the maintenance of individual functions and performances; those 
approaches interested in local properties such as the persistence and stability of specific 
molecules or classes of molecules (see for example Pascal & Pross, 2016); and system-oriented 
approaches that address robustness as a property related to (and emerging from) collective self-
production. This chapter, which aims to contribute to an understanding of the fundamental 
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adaptive properties common to living organisms, takes the system-oriented path, and addresses 
robustness in the context of biological autonomous organizations2.  
In this scenario, robustness is usually characterized as a network property, mostly related 
to forms of stability (Kitano 2007), and described dynamically in terms of properties of 
attractors or of the capability to shift between attractors. When mechanistic aspects are taken 
into account, robustness is often understood in terms of feedback loops, and of their capability 
to make attractors more stable or to facilitate the establishing of new steady states when the 
systems’ dynamics are displaced from the initial ones3.  
These properties are very general and widespread, and not specifically biological: they can 
be exhibited by many types of natural and artificial networks. A case of special interest for its 
proximity to biology is that of out-of-equilibrium self-maintaining chemical systems: 
dissipative structures emerging and maintaining themselves under specific external boundary 
conditions, like Benard cells, tornados, whirlpools etc. (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). They 
share some properties with living systems, such as stability and out-of-equilibrium self-
maintenance but, importantly, they lack the capability of self-production, and the internal 
organization and functional differentiation that are distinctive of biological systems.  
Let us consider the most basic instances of robustness in biological systems. It is possible 
to think of prebiotic systems and the of earliest (and simplest) forms of life as distributed 
biochemical networks of processes of production capable of generating and maintaining stable 
dynamic regimes, encapsulated by a compartment of their own making. An example is the 
basic scenario centered on metabolic self-production provided by the theory of autopoiesis 
(Varela et al. 1974; Maturana and Varela 1980), among similar approaches. The emphasis is 
on the network capability of the system as a whole to achieve a stable regime and employ 
distributed compensations for perturbations in such a way as to maintain the global 
organization of the system stable. In such a scenario robustness could be achieved, for example, 
through the capability to recover after the loss of most of its catalysts (Piedrafita et al. 2010).  
A more detailed model of minimal biological organization is represented by Tibor Ganti’s 
Chemoton (Ganti 1979; Ganti 2003b), a system characterized by an internal differentiation 
between three coupled chemical subsystems ─ a metabolic cycle, a template subsystem and a 
compartment ─ working like the cogwheels of a clock 4 . This model describes a non-
hierarchical and very fragile basic biological network, exhibiting a certain (although low) 
degree of functional differentiation, and a minimal robustness that allows it to be viable under 
                                                             
2 As argued by Cornish-Bowden (2006), among others, most engineering approaches "often seem to imply little 
more than reductionist biology applied on a large scale" while a "systemic approach to biology ought to put the 
emphasis on the entire system". A somehow similar categorization is proposed by Dupré and O'Malley (2005), 
who distinguish between 'pragmatic systems biologists' – who find it useful to refer to some systems properties in 
terms of interactions and of integration of data – and 'systems-theoretic biologists' – who focus on the investigation 
of general systems principles. An interesting case is that of Robert Rosen, whose contributions include both 
engineering (Rosen, 1967; 1970) and system-oriented approaches (Rosen, 1972; 1985; 1991), and who saw the 
former as inadequate to capture the distinctive features of living organisms as systems (Rosen, 1991). 
3 For different ways to achieve biological robustness through stability see for example Rosen (1970), a classic 
textbook in dynamical systems theory. 
4 The coupling between these subsystems is realised by means of supply and demand of metabolites necessary for 
the production of the components in the different subsystems (metabolic complementarity). The subsystems 
provide the necessary substrates for the internal processes of production taking place in the others and, in turn, 
consume the metabolites supplied by the others. 
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a limited range of environmental conditions (Bechtel, 2007), and to cope with stochastic 
variation (Segbroeck et al. 2009).  
In this scenario, a minimal form of biological robustness is achieved. It can be understood 
in terms of dynamic stability5 of the self-producing and self-maintaining distributed network 
organization that puts together the basic living system. This organization realizes highly 
distributed endogenous patterns of compensations that respond to variation in such a way that 
the system remains within its viability region. The system simply ‘‘absorbs’’ the effects of 
perturbations or internal variations as a network, by compensating them through internal 
reciprocal adjustments between tightly coupled subsystems, while the whole dynamics is 
maintained in the initial attractor—or shifts to a new one6. 
Implicit in these accounts is the idea that prebiotic and early living systems were 
characterized by a distributed organization capable to achieve a minimal form of robustness as 
stability under very specific (almost invariant) and favorable environmental conditions7. Only 
later, an increase in the scope and efficiency of mechanisms related to robustness would have 
allowed living systems to survive in more variable environments. Vice versa, according to this 
view, today when the environments of current living systems are particularly favorable and 
almost invariant, many regulatory mechanisms would not be needed anymore. This is the case 
of many intracellular endosymbionts, which live under very stable conditions within the 
cellular internal environment of the host organism. They tend to undergo a reduction of their 
organizational complexity and genome size, and they lose several constitutive and 
compensatory mechanisms. An example is Buchnera aphidicola BCc ─ an endosymbiont of 
the cedar aphid Cinara cedri ─ which lost some of its regulatory mechanisms and also the 
capability to realize the full pathway for the synthesis of the amino acid tryptophan and the co-
enzyme riboflavin necessary for its own functioning and that of the host. The production of 
these components is achieved only by sharing biosynthetic pathways with other endosymbionts 
in the same host (Lamelas et al. 2011).  
Dynamic stability is an important property to understand and model some aspects of life 
and its robustness, but it is not an exclusively biological property. It is also crucial to explain 
the emergence of several relevant phenomena in chemistry and at the edge of biology, such as 
oscillatory behaviors in reaction networks (Semenov et al. 2016). The paradigmatic case of 
dynamic stability in these infra-biological domains is represented by  dissipative structures, 
where a high number of microscopic elements spontaneously self-organize and realize a stable 
global, macroscopic ordered configuration in the presence of a specific flow of energy and 
matter in far from thermodynamic equilibrium conditions (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). These 
                                                             
5 Dynamic stability is the capability to counterbalance the displacement of the system from a certain initial state, 
provoked by a perturbation, and end up in the same final state (Rosen 1970). It is a widespread property in the 
natural world, instantiated by any system whose dynamic behavior is characterized by the presence of at least one 
stable attractor. When realized collectively, dynamic stability is a distributed property of a whole network of 
reactions—it cannot be attributed to any single transformation, or to a partial subset of transformations. 
6 See Bich et al. (2016) for a discussion of dynamic stability in models of minimal living organizations. 
7 These favorable conditions might also include the presence of most of the necessary building blocks for early 
living systems, as claimed for example by the heterotrophic models of the origin of life (see for example Mansy 
et al. 2008). 
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dynamic structures show the capacity of reacting conservatively to a certain range of 
perturbations, due solely to distributed network properties.  
Yet, unlike these cases at the edge of biology, dynamic stability is not the only way actual 
living systems can achieve robustness. As pointed out by Hiroaki Kitano, the study of 
biological robustness should not be limited to dynamic stability, considered as a distributed 
property. Robustness should be understood, instead, as a more general phenomenon.  
“Whereas homeostasis and stability are somewhat related concepts, robustness 
is a more general concept according to which a system is robust as long as it 
maintains functionality, even if it transits through a new steady state or if 
instability actually helps the system to cope with perturbations. […] Examples 
of extreme robustness under harsh stress conditions show that organisms can 
attain an impressive degree of robustness by switching from one steady state to 
the other, rather than trying to maintain a given state. […] Robustness is also 
not identical to stability. Some species gain robustness by increasing instability 
in a part of its system” (Kitano 2007, 1–2). 
A theoretical account of biological robustness needs to take into consideration not only 
stability, but also more complex ways of achieving robustness. In particular, it should take into 
consideration modularity and hierarchy – two aspects which, according to Kitano, still require 
a proper formal characterization (Kitano 2004; Kitano 2007) 8 . Modularity may enable 
functional differentiation and, therefore, different contributions of subsystems to the 
maintenance of the more comprehensive system that harbors them. Hierarchy allows to 
modulate and coordinate such contributions in an efficient and precise way, and to specify in 
each circumstance how to ensure the viability of the whole system. 
As a matter of fact, biological systems can locally produce distributed network responses. 
However, one of their distinctive features is that they are internally organized in such a way 
that different subsystems contribute in different ways to the maintenance of the system 
(Montévil and Mossio 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015; Mossio et al. 2016). These features are 
absent in infra-biological thermodynamically open systems (see also Moreno and Ruiz-Mirazo 
2009; Mossio et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2012).  
One of the consequences of being internally organized and functionally differentiated is that 
the interactions between the components of a system can take place in ways that are 
qualitatively different from one another, and they can play distinct causal roles within the 
system. This differentiation might be invisible to a network characterization, focused on 
patterns of interconnectivity and numbers of connections, rather than types of interactions. As 
a consequence, alternative and more complex way to achieve achieving robustness that are 
distinctively biological might be passed over9. This is a serious conceptual issue if we consider 
                                                             
8 It does not imply that different forms of robustness, based respectively on dynamic stability, and modular and 
hierarchical control mechanisms cannot coexist in the same system or subsystem. 
9 This issue is closely related to the debate on the relationship between mechanistic and network descriptions. 
Whereas mechanisms describe distinguishable parts which play different specific tasks, network descriptions 
focus on global properties and patterns of connectivity (Moreno et al., 2011). Finding ways to bring together 
network and mechanistic descriptions, apparently irreducible to each other, is on the of the challenges faced by 
complex systems theory. An attempt to develop an heuristic to move between the two descriptive approaches has 
been proposed by Bechtel (2017a; 2017b). The basic idea is that clusters of interconnections in a network 
description are possible candidates for the parts of the mechanistic description of the same system. The limit of 
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that in all known instances of living systems, biological robustness is not achieved exclusively 
through reciprocal adjustments between the coupled subsystems of a distributed network, and 
indeed all living systems employ also other forms of direct control of the basic dynamics that 
imply a more active role of the system organization in handling variation (Bich and Damiano 
2012b).  
With the aim to tackle this issue, the following sections will not dwell upon robustness as 
a property of stable networks, but on mechanisms that are more demanding in terms of 
organizational requirements, such as hierarchical regulatory mechanisms. However, this 
approach needs to face some conceptual difficulties related to the specific object of study. Basic 
living systems, such as bacteria, are characterized by fluid biochemical machineries with low 
internal structural differentiation, realized by highly distributed interactions where each 
component interacts with ─ or is indirectly influenced by ─ many others. These features favor 
network descriptions and seem to make it particularly difficult to provide a characterization of 
robustness in terms different functional contributions to the viability of the system. This 
scenario, therefore, requires the introduction of theoretical tools to operationally distinguish 
between distinct kinds of interactions in the systems. These tools can then allow us to address 
issues related to complex biological robustness such control and regulation, to operationally 
identify which components or subsystems act as controllers or regulators, and to distinguish 
them from those other subsystems that are the targets of their activities.  
2.1. Control and signal 
Let us proceed stepwise by first clarifying some basic concepts such as control and signal in 
the framework of autonomy.  
Autonomous biological systems constantly produce, transform, repair and replace their 
own components, and maintain themselves through exchanges of matter and energy with the 
environment. Unlike dissipative structures, which are mostly and largely determined by 
external boundary conditions, they do not emerge spontaneously under appropriate 
environmental conditions, but they contribute to determine their own conditions of existence 
(Mossio and Bich, 2017). In order to maintain themselves in far-from-equilibrium conditions, 
they need to exert some control over their underlying thermodynamic processes which would 
otherwise proceed toward equilibrium. 
Control is generally defined as the capability to modify the dynamics of a system toward a 
certain state (e.g. parameters acting upon variables, enzyme upon concentrations of 
metabolites, etc.10). It is an asymmetric interaction. In biological systems control is exerted by 
some molecules or supra-molecular structures, generated and maintained by the system itself, 
                                                             
this approach is that patterns and network configurations derived from numbers of connections do not provide the 
same kind of information on the system as the identification of different types of contributions (e.g. in metabolism 
a complex hierarchy involving, metabolites, enzymes acting on metabolites, energy currencies, kinases acting on 
enzymes, etc.), but a complementary one.  
10 See for example Rosen 1970; Hofmeyr and Cornish-Bowden 1991. 
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which act as constraints11 on thermodynamic (matter/energy) flows12. A biological system is 
capable of generating some of the (internal) constraints that control its dynamics in such a way 
that they collectively achieve self-maintenance. These constraints are involved in at least three 
main kinds of control mechanisms. One is kinetic control (e.g., catalysis), which specifies the 
rates of diverse synthetic pathways: e.g. an enzyme that harnesses (catalyzes) a chemical 
reaction (without being directly affected by it). A second one is spatial control, which defines 
the spatial scale of the system, the selective passage of molecules, and thereby, the 
concentrations of its components. Examples are selectively permeable boundaries and 
diffusion barriers, which avoid the dilution of certain key compounds and keep their 
concentration above critical threshold values. A third kind is template control (e.g. DNA, 
mRNA13), responsible for constraining the sequences of amino acids in proteins.  
The distinctive feature of biological systems is that the constraints which exert these basic 
types of control are organized in such a way that they are mutually dependent for their 
production and maintenance, and collectively contribute to maintain the conditions at which 
the whole network can persist (Moreno and Mossio 2015). This continuous operational 
integration puts together the constitutive regime (C) responsible for the basic self-production 
and self-maintenance of a living system14. This basic regime involves at least two different 
kinds of interactions ─ processes and constraints acting on processes ─ and it is characterized 
by the strict stoichiometric coupling between the subsystems involved. Responses to variation 
are essentially governed by changes in concentrations (both of the substrates that take part in 
the processes, and of the molecular structures that carry out control tasks on those metabolites). 
In this context, robustness is achieved as a network property: variations in concentrations 
affecting a given process or subsystem can propagate throughout the system, producing the 
change of one or several other processes and control subsystems which, in turn, compensate 
for the initial one. As a result, the system can be regarded as stable. 
The activity of control constraints can be affected in different ways15. In the context of the 
constitutive regime alone, the most basic ways to affect the activity and rates of control 
subsystems are through direct molecular interactions, changes in the concentrations of the 
substrates and products of the processes upon which the constraints act16 and, finally, through 
variations in the processes responsible for the synthesis of the control components themselves, 
resulting in changes in the concentrations of the control components in the system. 
                                                             
11 Given a particular thermodynamics process P, a molecular configuration C acts as a constraint upon P if: (1) at 
a time scale characteristic of P, C is locally unaffected by P; (2) at this time scale C exerts a causal role on P, i.e. 
there is some observable difference between free P, and P under the influence of C (Mossio et al. 2013, 164. A 
more detailed characterisation can be found in Montévil and Mossio 2015). 
12 See Pattee 1972; Bich et al. 2016; Winning and Bechtel 2018, for a discussion of control in biological systems. 
See Arnellos et al. 2014 and Veloso 2017, for a discussion of inter-cellular control mechanisms in development. 
13 See for example Mossio et al. 2016 for a characterisation of the role of mRNA as a constraint. 
14 See Nghe et al. (2015) and Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno (2004) for a discussion of the some of the key elements 
for the origin of these self-producing and self-maintaining networks in prebiotic conditions. 
15 The requirement for a structure to be a constraint is to be locally unaffected by the process they are harnessing. 
But a constraint can be affected by other interactions in the system. 
16 For example, the effects described by the law of mass action. 
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All these are constitutive interactions governed by stoichiometry. However, there are 
additional ways in which the activity of control subsystems can be affected. These additional 
modalities open new spaces of possibilities for the action of control subsystems (new degrees 
of freedom) and are responsible for the complexification of biological organizations. It is the 
case of  signal molecules. In living systems they play a fundamental role in the coordination 
and integration between subsystems in response to both internal variation and interactions with 
the environment. The distinctive features of signals in general, as argued by Haven Wiley, are 
the capability to trigger a response in the targets without providing the energy for it, and the 
fact that their causal power is insufficient for determining the response. The response, 
therefore, depends to a large degree on the properties of the receiver (Wiley 2013).  
In the framework of autonomy described above, signals are not part of constitutive 
processes. They are usually by-products of biosynthetic processes and, more importantly, their 
role as signals does not consist in participating as metabolites in production processes. They 
do not act as constraints either, but they usually interact with control constraints by giving rise 
to activated or inhibited molecular complexes. A paradigmatic case is constituted by cyclic 
AMP, a ubiquitous signal molecule in cells, which forms molecular complexes with regulatory 
proteins like kinases ─ responsible for the activation or inhibition of enzymes ─ and also with 
other regulatory proteins such as CAP (catabolic activation protein), which interacts with the 
promoters of the genes coding for the enzymes involved in the metabolism of glucose. 
3. Biological Regulation 
Another way control constraints can be affected or modulated beyond constitutive interactions 
is hierarchically, by the direct action of other specialized constraints in the system. These 
internally produced, second-order control subsystems provide a living system with the 
capability to act on its own constitutive dynamics. They can be functionally recruited into 
regulatory mechanisms (R) that modulate constitutive control constraints on the basis of 
internal and external signals in such a way as to maintain the overall viability of the system17. 
These higher-order architectures open a new space of possible control operations. They enable 
the realization of more complex mechanisms that contribute to enhancing the robustness of the 
system, beyond and on top of the constitutive ones, which instead are ruled by changes in 
concentrations and embedded in the basic self-maintaining network.  
In this new organizational architecture, the functional role of a regulatory subsystem is to 
modulate the basic constitutive network, by shifting between distinct metabolic regimes 
available to the system in relation to changes in environmental conditions. It does so in such a 
way that the new metabolic/constitutive regimes brought forth by regulatory shifts should be 
capable of coping with the new environmental conditions and internal variation, thus extending 
the range of perturbations or stimuli to which the system may respond in a rapid and efficient 
way, as well as enriching the sphere of dynamic functional behaviors available. 
One of the difficulties that arise when addressing control and regulation, is to find an 
operational/naturalized way to distinguish between the regulator and what is regulated. 
Regulatory control cannot be regarded as a straightforward extension of the collective control 
that enables the dynamical stability of the constitutive regime. It is not the consequence of 
                                                             
17 For a more detailed discussion of biological regulation as second-order control see Bich et al. (2016). 
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either a different way to wire constraints and processes, or of the introduction of additional 
functional nodes in the basic self-maintaining network. In these cases, the result would still be 
a constitutive network.  
A more complex organizational architecture is required in order to realize regulation. Its 
distinctiveness and the difficulty in characterizing it, stem from the fact that a regulatory 
subsystem (R) is part of the living system, and like the other parts is produced and maintained 
by the processes integrating the constitutive regime (C). Yet, to act as a second order controller 
of C, R needs to work according to a different logic than the one characteristic of C, which is 
based on the strict (stoichiometric) coupling between control subsystems18. R needs to be able 
to exhibit some independence ─ i.e. a dynamical decoupling ─ from what takes place in C, in 
order to freely and asymmetrically modulate the activity of the control constraints in C on the 
basis of signals. This capability can be achieved when R exhibits additional degrees of freedom 
with respect to the controllers in C. Some of these new degrees of freedom make R sensitive 
to activation and inhibition signals, while not being directly dependent on the state of C. Others 
endow R with the effector capability to modulate the activity of the controllers in C (Bich et 
al. 2016).  
The decoupling required in order for R to be operationally distinct from C, and capable to 
independently modulate the latter, is realized when the operations of the regulatory subsystem 
R are neither specified nor directly determined by the metabolic activity of C: i.e. they are 
‘stoichiometrically free’ from the latter (Griesemer and Szathmáry 2009). More specifically, 
the activation and operation of a regulatory subsystem R is not directly dependent on its 
concentration (or variation of concentration) ─ that is, on its production by C ─ even though C 
guarantees its presence in the system (Bich et al. 2016). Instead, the activation of R is triggered 
by signals, and its operations depend on its internal organization and on the structure of its 
functional parts (in particular molecular geometries that are complementary to those of the 
controlled constraints in C). In such a way the activity of R is operationally distinct from C, 
and R can act as a dedicated regulatory controller of C. The functional regulatory loop realized 
by a control architecture so built, takes place in three steps: (1) a signal or perturbation activates 
R, which (2) in turn modulates C and brings forth a new constitutive regime. Finally, (3) the 
modification of C enables the system to cope with the specific variation which triggered the 
regulatory response. 
This general theoretical model applies to autonomous systems at different levels of 
organization. Let us now consider two examples of how living systems ─ basic ones such as 
bacteria and multicellular systems like mammals ─ rely on mechanisms of regulation to 
adaptively respond to the composition (or variation in the composition) of their internal and 
external environments.  
Some of the most basic mechanisms of regulation are present at the very core of biological 
machinery, such as protein synthesis. Organisms need to be able to determine which 
proteins/enzymes to produce on the basis of their internal state, of the availability of specific 
                                                             
18 As argued by William Bechtel, “Although stoichiometric linkages between reactions are effective for insuring 
linkages between operations, they do not provide a means for varying the reactions independently. Such 
independent control can only be achieved by a property not directly linked to the critical stoichiometry of the 
system” (Bechtel 2007, 229). 
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amino acids, and of the characteristics of the environment. To do so they need to activate, 
inhibit and modulate the synthesis of specific proteins according to their needs. The regulation 
of protein synthesis can take place at many different steps of this process: at the level of DNA 
through the control of transcription, which involves longer time scales; at the level of RNA 
through RNA processing control, RNA transport and localization control, translational control, 
mRNA degradation control, etc.; and at the post-translational level by modulating, at shorter 
time scales, the folding and activity of proteins ─ e.g. through forms of allosteric control, 
phosphorylation, etc.  
Let us consider for example how bacteria modulate the metabolism of tryptophan through 
a regulatory control of the transcription step. Bacteria are able to produce this amino acid when 
it is not available in the environment. The genes responsible for the five enzymes which 
contribute to its synthesis are grouped together into one operon. A repressor protein exerts a 
regulatory control upon the promoter of the operon, by repressing it in presence of tryptophan 
in the cell. Two molecules of this amino acid act as the signals that allosterically activate the 
repressor protein. When tryptophan is present in the environment, the repressor protein is 
activated and blocks the endogenous production of this amino acid by repressing the synthesis 
of the enzymes responsible for it. In absence of tryptophan, instead, the repressor protein is in 
an inhibited state, and the cell can start synthesizing the enzymes responsible for the production 
of the amino acid. In this example the regulator R (the repressor protein) is dynamically 
decoupled from the constitutive regime C, i.e. from the enzyme-coding operon and the 
metabolism of tryptophan. The activity of the repressor protein does not depend on variation 
in its own concentration ─ which is determined by the rates of C19  ─ but, rather, on its 
(stoichiometrically free) structural affinities with the signal molecules and with the promoter 
sequence. 
The second example concerns the regulation of glucose concentrations in mammals through 
glycogen synthesis during fast and food uptake20. The metabolic pathway that in mammal cells 
connects glucose to G6P (through the GT/HK subsystem) and then to glycogen (through the 
GSase subsystem) is characterized by homeostatic capabilities, that in the fasting state of low 
glucose level can compensate slight variations in glucose through negative feedbacks and other 
distributed responses (Schafer et al. 2005).21 Yet, the unregulated metabolic pathway alone is 
not able to cope through a network response with the strong increase in glucose that takes 
places during food uptake.  
Therefore, additional mechanisms such as the release of insulin are implemented to prevent 
glucose from reaching dangerously high levels, by activating and increasing glycogen synthesis 
sufficiently and quickly enough to cope with the rise in plasma concentration of glucose. 
                                                             
19 The concentration of repressor proteins is usually low (proportional to the number of copies of the promoter 
sequence it regulates) and does not undergo variation in concentrations to bring forth its regulatory effect. The 
lac-operon system, a more complex example of genetic regulation, which coordinates of the metabolism of two 
sugars (lactose and glucose) through the second-order control of the transcription step, follows the same logic (see 
Bich et al. 2016 for an analysis of regulatory decoupling in this latter case). 
20 Specifically, the example relies on the analysis of glycogen synthesis in the rat gastrocnemius muscle provided 
in Schafer et al. (2005). 
21 See also J. S. Hofmeyr and Cornish-Bowden (2000) for an analysis of this type of stoichiometrically dependent 
responses. 
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“Larger-scale flux changes operating on a more intermediate time scale will involve an external 
detector/effector (e.g. pancreas/insulin) that stimulates both up- and downstream subsystems, 
thereby maintaining excellent internal and external homeostasis despite increased flux” 
(Schafer et al. 2005, 69).  
The release of insulin by the pancreas is triggered by signals in presence of high 
concentrations of glucose, and it leads to the “coordinate activation of glucose transport, 
hexokinase and glycogen synthase” (Schafer et al. 2005, 67)22 which allows metabolizing the 
exceeding sugar. In virtue of the action of the pancreas/insulin regulatory subsystem, 
dynamically decoupled from the intracellular metabolism of muscular cells, the system as a 
whole can reach a new regime that is able to cope with the perturbing variation ─ the absorption 
of glucose through food.  
This example shows how distributed network properties (dynamic stability) and regulatory 
mechanisms coexist and interact to enhance the organism’s robustness, and what is the crucial 
role played by regulation in integrating and coordinating some core metabolic functions to 
maintain the viability of the whole system. The main point is that, whereas intracellular stability 
network mechanisms that compensate for slight variations in glucose concentrations are always 
at work during fast, they do not guarantee the viability of the system in response to a strong 
increase of glucose that occur during food uptake. During food uptake, regulatory mechanisms 
intervene by releasing insulin, and they bring forth a coordinate response of the organism’s 
metabolism to transform glucose into glycogen. This case also shows that regulation does not 
depend solely on genetic control ─ which requires more time to exert its effects. When quick 
responses are needed, they can be achieved by the coordinated control of the activation state of 
several enzymes and subsystems in a pathway. 
4. Regulation at the crossroads between identity, complexity, and cognition 
A possible approach to the study of the nature and evolution of biological robustness is to 
consider dynamic stability as the default property of self-producing and self-maintaining 
prebiotic and minimal living systems. According to this view, additional and more complex 
regulatory mechanisms were later developed beyond the constitutive regime C. These 
mechanisms act on top of C, and they allow the system to cope with a wider range of variations 
and to improve the specificity of its responses to perturbations. Regulation, therefore, 
contributes to extend the viability space of the already dynamically stable biological system23.  
In this view, the requirements for the emergence of biological regulation would also 
roughly coincide with fundamental transitions in the process of evolution of robustness, leading 
from basic stability to full-fledged adaptive regulation. They would include the emergence of: 
(a) organizational self-production and self-maintenance; (b) functional differentiation; (c) 
network stability; (d) multistability; and (e) sequence dependent components that enable 
stoichiometric freedom by means of interactions based on complementary molecular geometry.  
                                                             
22 One of the effects of the release of insulin is the rapid change of the phosphorylation state of the enzyme 
glycogen synthase (GSase), which alters its kinetics. It is a clear case of second order control interaction, in which 
a regulatory subsystem acts on a first order control constraints (GSase) by activating (or inhibiting) it.  
23 Another way to express the idea is that systems can be alive under very special stable conditions, without 
regulatory mechanisms, by relying only on the constitutive network. Regulation would then become necessary 
only when the system is immersed in changing environments and develops a higher internal differentiation. 
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In particular, steps (d) and (e) would be crucial for the transition towards regulation. 
Multistability enables the realization of distinct constitutive regimes which, in turn, may allow 
the system to remain viable under different conditions. As it has been recently shown, 
bistability and related properties such as oscillations, can arise already in simple autocatalytic 
networks of relevant organic reactions such as those involved in origins of life (Semenov et al. 
2016). The problem that arises at this step is how to govern multiple stability precisely and 
efficiently: a distributed system characterized by multiple possible stable regimes can be more 
and more fragile the higher the number of attractors. Yet, the existence of more than one viable 
regime is the basis upon which specialized second-order control subsystems can functionally 
act and bring forth transitions in C, compatibly with internal and external conditions. One way 
to look at multistability is to regard it as a starting point, capable to generate a new adjacent 
possible (Kauffman 2000) in the evolution of robustness. The additional requirement for the 
development of regulatory capabilities is then the presence in the system of geometry-
dependent molecular complexes that can be recruited by the system to operate as dynamically 
decoupled switches that control the shifts between attractors in C. 
It is therefore reasonable to think that regulation is dependent on the existence of a full-
fledged constitutive network already capable to exhibit stability (and multistability) and, 
consequently, that it is both logically and historically secondary to more basic forms of 
biological robustness. A possible weakness of this idea it that the stoichiometric couplings that 
characterize the constitutive regime are very fragile: anything disturbing the delicate balance 
of metabolites or creating a new branching in the metabolic pathways would easily break the 
system apart. Moreover, some further considerations that will be discussed in Sect. 6.4.1. might 
make us question this idea and admit the possibility that mechanisms responsible for complex 
form of robustness might have already been necessary for the realization of a constitutive 
regime and for the emergence of some of the fundamental properties of biological systems. 
4.1. Functional integration and organizational complexity 
Functional integration can be characterized as the degree of interdependence between the 
(functional) subsystems that are necessary to realize and maintain the system that harbors them. 
As argued in Section 2.1, the integration into one coherent system of several types of kinetic, 
spatial and template control constraints is the basis for the realization of a self-maintaining and 
self-producing biochemical machinery. The way these subsystems are put together constitutes 
the specific organization of the constitutive regime of the system. This organization is what 
determines its identity as a living system, characterized by functional autonomy, cohesion, and 
asymmetry with respect to the environment. There are different ways in which the subsystems 
of a basic autonomous organization can operate in a functionally integrated fashion (Bich 
2016). The simplest ones are constituted by (1) metabolic complementarities ─ in which the 
products of one subsystem become the substrates for the processes controlled by another, like 
in the case of the chemoton ─ or (2) forms of cross control ─ in which control constraints are 
the direct products of the process harnessed by other constraints in the network (e.g. cross-
catalysis).  
Yet, the integration of subsystems into a basic constitutive network cannot be achieved by 
simply coupling pre-existing molecular or supramolecular complexes and recruiting them as 
control constraints.  As pointed out by Shirt-Ediss, “the first systems with the ability to robustly 
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maintain themselves far-from-equilibrium […] could only have existed as such if they were 
encapsulated and their internal (proto-metabolic) organization and compartment were tightly 
integrated’’ (Shirt-Ediss 2016, 85). This tight integration requires a matching between the 
features of the subsystems involved: for instance, the composition of the membrane and the 
position of its molecular machineries to meet the demands of metabolism; the synthesis of the 
right components by metabolism to be used in compartments to achieve the required 
permeability. As it has been recently argued, “the encapsulation of a self-maintaining chemical 
system has far-reaching organizational implications since its viability imposes significant 
changes on both parts (compartments and metabolic networks) in order to enable a functional 
coupling between them” (Moreno 2016, 10).  
A minimal constitutive network might not be enough to realize a living autonomous system, 
and surely not to achieve more complex forms of biological organization, not only because of 
its overall fragility. The basic functional subsystems, in fact, need not only to be matched. Also 
their activity and rates need to be functionally coordinated in order to achieve integration, to 
avoid conflict, and to realize robustness at the system level under changing internal and external 
conditions24. The functional coordination necessary to realize and maintain this integrated 
organization might already require control hierarchies such as those realized by regulatory 
mechanisms.  
As a matter of fact, all current living systems employ forms of hierarchical control to 
modulate the relations between their constitutive subsystems in such a way that they are 
capable to coordinate their basic functions and achieve integration. In bacteria, for example, 
membrane channels are not only activated directly by concentration gradients, but also by 
protein phosphorylation triggered by specific signals from the environment and the metabolism 
(Karpen 2004; Kulasekara and Miller 2007). In turn, signals from the membrane can trigger 
the regulation of gene expression, which can affect metabolism in a way that is compatible 
with the state of the membrane (Stock et al. 1989). The coordination between genome and 
metabolism is exemplified by genetic regulatory mechanisms such as the tryptophan operon, 
described above, which modulates metabolism through protein synthesis, compatibly with the 
composition of the internal and external environments of the living system. The lac-operon 
provides an even more interesting case: the regulatory mechanisms that govern the diauxic shift 
between glucose and lactose metabolisms, coordinate two different functional regimes within 
metabolism itself according to the state of the internal and external environments (Jacob and 
Monod 1961; Bich et al. 2016). Bacterial chemotaxis is another example in which the 
coordination between two functional subsystems ─ metabolism and the flagellum responsible 
for movement ─ is achieved, in different ways, through the activity of a regulatory mechanism 
(Eisenbach 2004; van Duijn et al. 2006; Eisenbach 2007; Alexandre 2010; Bich and Moreno 
2016). These examples show that regulation plays a role in achieving the functional integration 
                                                             
24 Different subsystems might present different internal norms of operation, and need to be coordinated to ensure 
both their compatibility and their joint functional contribution to the maintenance of the system. Another relevant 
feature of biological cells is that they cannot synthesise all the possible molecules at the same time, due to 
energetic and spatial limits. Therefore, they have to exert some control over biosynthetic processes in order to 
produce the necessary components at the right times. Other types of functional resources need coordination as 
well. Let us think of the interplay between metabolic regimes relying on different carbon sources, such as lactose 
and glucose. Without the proper regulation (realised for example by the lac-operon subsystem) these regimes 
would compete for basic catalytic resources in the cell.  
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necessary for the continuous realization of the constitutive regime of biological autonomous 
systems, starting from their simplest instances in the prokaryotic world.  
A further remark concerns organizational complexity. As argued above, a basic constitutive 
regime already exhibits a relevant internal complexity that allows it to harbor the functional 
differentiation necessary for its production and maintenance. Such degree of complexity cannot 
be supported reliably by means of network properties alone in presence of variations, insofar 
as generating a compensatory effect depends on propagating changes through many local 
interactions. As argued by Wayne Christensen (2007), in this context achieving reliability and 
specificity of responses becomes an issue. The time required for the responses depends on both 
the size of the system and the degree of complexity found in it, and, as argued above, the 
internal complexity required for a constitutive network is already high. Additional problems 
derive from the difficulties in generating multiple differentiated global states and in reaching 
the appropriate one for a given perturbation. The lack of specificity in the responses is 
responsible for the increased fragility of the systems when its internal complexity rises, unless 
additional switch mechanisms devoted to the selective modulation of the basic dynamics are in 
place. What regulation does is precisely to make it possible to overcome this bottleneck of 
complexity, by endowing the system with the capability to induce the appropriate collective 
pattern of behavior in a more rapid and efficacious way. The responses so produced are 
specific, and they are not negatively affected by the size of the system.  
Moreover, evolutionarily speaking, the adaptation of constitutive networks to new 
environmental perturbations would require each time a modification of the organization of the 
core constitutive network of the system, which would more likely drive the system to disruption 
than to the complex responses. A modification of those subsystems dedicated to handling 
internal changes, such as switches, instead, provides more reliable solutions (see Kirschner and 
Gerhart 2005), that do not only provide further viability, but also enable the increase of 
complexity. 
The individual and evolutionary capability to maintain or enhance robustness at the system 
level ─ by extending the range of internal and external variations the system is capable to cope 
with, and by enabling internal differentiation without loss of viability ─ are the results of a 
trade-off between stability and complexity. Dynamically stable distributed systems are fragile 
under qualitatively different conditions, and unspecific in their responses. To implement those 
differential and specific responses necessary to maintain a complex organization and to respond 
to a variety of changing conditions, internal variability (increased degrees of freedom) under 
the coordination of regulatory mechanisms is fundamental, and it is realized at the expenses of 
the intrinsic stability of the constitutive regime and of its subsystems25.  
In sum, the increase of robustness at the system level goes hand in hand with increases of 
complexity and of internal variability, and it can take place only through the action of 
regulatory mechanisms. Novel and higher levels of regulation need to be invented to ensure 
the maintenance of an increasingly complex constitutive (or low-level) part of the system. As 
                                                             
25 The idea of improving adaptivity and robustness by increasing the degrees of freedom available to the systems’ 
dynamics at the expense of distributed stability of the network can be found already in Piaget’s school (Meyer 
1967). For a recent discussion of the interplay between organisation and variation in biology see instead Montévil 
et al. (2016). 
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the complexity of the system increases, the corresponding regulatory subsystem is bound to 
become increasingly necessary for the continuous maintenance of the basic organization, from 
minimal living systems to more complex forms of life.  
4.2. Minimal cognition 
The capability of living systems to adaptively cope with their interactions with the environment 
by means of regulatory mechanisms is also closely related to the question of the origin and 
characterization of minimal cognition26. Traditionally, the authors that first developed the 
framework of autonomy ─ in particular Piaget (1967) and Maturana and Varela (1980) ─ 
defended the view according to which cognition consists basically in the viable interactions 
that the organism can enter with the environment without losing its identity, and the internal 
modifications it undergoes in this process. This approach considers cognition in its minimal 
form as coextensive with life or coinciding with the interactive dimension of life. The general 
idea underlying this thesis is that what for physical systems would be just external influence, 
in living system is adaptively integrated and transformed into a “meaningful interpretation” 
(Heschl 1990, 13). Another way to formulate it, is that since autonomous systems ─ and, 
therefore, all living beings ─ are capable of “enacting a meaningful world”, they would also 
ipso facto be cognitive agents, at least in a minimal sense (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela 
et al. 1991; Bitbol and Luisi 2004; Bourgine and Stewart 2004). According to this perspective, 
then, the adaptive behavior of minimal organisms such as bacteria is already a cognitive 
phenomenon. 
A different view is supported by those who argue that even though some of the properties 
exhibited by minimal living systems are important aspects of cognition, they are not sufficient 
to capture cognition. One of the weaknesses of the thesis that cognition emerges already with 
unicellular life, it has been argued, is that that by dissolving cognition in broader biological 
phenomena, then it would become difficult to understand the nature, function, and evolutionary 
history of cognition as a specific phenomenon (Moreno et al. 1997). According to these latter 
approaches, it is increased behavioral capacities (Christensen and Hooker 2000) or a higher 
degree of organizational complexity ─ namely, a nervous system decoupled from metabolism, 
and with its own distinctive norms (Barandiaran and Moreno 2006) ─ which are the primary 
discriminating dimensions of cognition.  
Bechtel, among others, sustains a position closer to the former one, and provides a 
theoretical and heuristic justification for addressing cognition already at the level of bacteria: 
“Evolution is a highly conserved process, and the mechanisms developed in our common 
ancestors with these species provide the foundation for many of our cognitive activities. Since 
these organisms lack some of the complications that have evolved in us, research on them can 
help reveal key features of our cognitive mechanisms” (Bechtel 2014, 158). Other supporters 
of minimal cognition at the unicellular level argue that the decoupling between metabolism and 
                                                             
26 See Bich and Moreno (2016) for a more detailed discussion of minimal cognition in relation to biological 
regulation. 
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cognition takes place already in bacterial chemotaxis, and propose an account of minimal 
cognition based on sensory-motor activity (van Duijn et al. 2006).27  
The account of regulation proposed here provides a generalized theoretical model to 
understand the most basic decoupling responsible for minimal forms of cognition: the 
decoupling between adaptive regulation and constitutive metabolism. The adaptive capability 
provided by regulation is not specific of sensory-motor activity, but rather exhibits a more 
fundamental logic common to all regulatory mechanisms dedicated to the interaction with the 
environment, such as for example the tryptophan and lac operons (Bich et al. 2016). When 
applied to cognition, therefore, the notion of decoupling from constitutive metabolism needs 
to be addressed in this more encompassing context, which transcends sensory-motor activity 
to include other forms of (sensory effector) adaptivity. The central idea is that one of the 
essential aspects of cognition that can be analyzed at the basic level of biological organization, 
is that cognitive agents should be able to distinguish between some specific features of their 
interaction with the environment and to act accordingly, in such a way as to maintain their 
viability. And this fundamental requirement for cognition can be met only in presence of 
regulatory mechanisms (Bich and Moreno 2016). 
When a mechanism of regulation is at work, the environment is not only a source of 
indistinguishable perturbations, but also of specific and recognizable ones. The crucial point is 
that the regulated system reacts in a distinctive way: it does things according to what it 
distinguishes (what activates the regulatory subsystem) in its interactions with the environment. 
In the presence of regulatory mechanisms perturbations do not directly drive the response of 
the system. It is the regulatory subsystem, activated by specific perturbations, which modulates 
the constitutive one. It does so in such a way that the system as a whole becomes able to cope 
with the environmental perturbations which triggered the regulatory response: the organism 
eats a new source of food, or secrets chemicals to neutralize a lethal substance, etc. 
In this context, an environmental perturbation becomes a specific and recognizable 
interaction because of the nature of the relation it holds with the regulatory subsystem. The 
response of the system is the result of the evaluation operated by the regulatory subsystem 
(activation-plus-action). The regulatory subsystem establishes “classes of equivalence” (Rosen 
1978) in the environment according to how the variation activates it and triggers the regulatory 
action, so that such categories are actually employed by the system to modify its own internal 
dynamics in a viable way. Therefore perturbations achieve an endogenous, operational, 
significance for the system: the interactions with the environment become more than just a 
source of indistinct noise, but are converted into a world of endogenously generated 
(naturalized) significances. 
This approach still leaves open the question whether these cognitive relevant properties are 
sufficient for cognition ─ and bacteria should be considered as fully-fledged cognitive ─ or a 
new source of normativity needs to emerge on top of the one related to the metabolic viability 
of the cell. This latter view is supported for example by the advocates of the emergence of 
cognition with the nervous system (Barandiaran and Moreno 2006).  
                                                             
27 See Godfrey-Smith (2016) for a critical discussion of this account of minimal cognition focused on sensory-
motor activity. 
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A related question is whether a theory of minimal cognition should account for the simplest 
instantiation of those features we ascribe to human or higher animal cognition ─ and depict its 
evolution as continuous from the appearance of the nervous system ─ or consider minimal 
cognition as a distinct category in itself, specified by a first decoupling from the constitutive 
regime and capable to generate behavioral capabilities analogous to those found in 
multicellular systems. In the latter case the evolution of cognition would be understood as a 
discontinuous process characterized by the emergence of several decouplings. However, 
whichever position is adopted, the adaptive regulatory mechanisms that confer robustness to 
the system, by realizing different types of decoupling, play a relevant, if not crucial, role in the 
origin of cognition. 
5. Final Remarks 
What is the relationship between robustness and autonomy in living systems? An answer can 
be found by looking at biologically distinctive ways to achieve robustness beyond and on top 
of general network properties. The advantages of pursuing an organizational approach to this 
question, is that it allows us to identify and analyze robustness mechanisms by focusing on 
different types of contributions to the realization and maintenance of a biological system: for 
instance, processes, constraints, control, signals and regulation. This approach also provides an 
understanding of robustness, functional differentiation, modularity and integration in the 
encompassing context of a living cell or of a multicellular organism, rather than in relation to 
individual properties or performances of a system, or of parts of it. Moreover, the 
thermodynamic nature of the notion of constraint, as used in this approach,28 can be useful in 
the attempt to lay a bridge between robustness and thermodynamics, one of the open issues in 
the field of robustness (Kitano 2007).  
From this theoretical standpoint, this paper has advocated the view according to which 
mechanisms related to robustness ─ and, specifically, regulatory ones ─ play a fundamental 
role at the core of biological organization. They contribute not only to enhancing the viability 
of the system under changing conditions. They also make it possible to coordinate and integrate 
the basic constitutive functions of a living system and to overcome bottlenecks of complexity. 
Moreover, they are the basic requirements for the emergence of minimal forms of cognition or 
of cognitively relevant properties. Some questions remain open, among which: whether or not 
such mechanisms played a role in the origin of life, and whether a viable minimal biological 
system integrating metabolism, compartment and template can be actually realized without 
regulatory mechanisms, although in very special or controlled environmental conditions. A 
negative response to the latter question would then require a revision of our theoretical models 
of minimal life. 
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